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Originally published in 1923 - translated from the French by F. A. Holt, O.B.E.
Main Menu - Table of Contents
Volume 1:
I. JULY 20-23, 1914 | II. JULY 24-AUGUST 2, 1914 | III.AUGUST 3-17, 1914 | IV. AUGUST 18-SEPTEMBER 11, 1914 | V. SEPTEMBER 12-OCTOBER 28, 1914 | VI. OCTOBER 29-NOVEMBER 30, 1914 | VII. DECEMBER 1-31, 1914 | VIII. JANUARY 1-FEBRUARY 13, 1915 | IX. FEBRUARY 14-MARCH 31, 1915 | X. APRIL 1-JUNE 2, 1915
Volume 2:
I. JUNE 3-AUGUST 24, 1915 | II. AUGUST 25-SEPTEMBER 20, 1915 | III.SEPTEMBER 21-NOVEMBER 8, 1915 | IV. NOVEMBER 9-DECEMBER 31, 1915 | V. JANUARY 1-26, 1916 | VI. JANUARY 27-FEBRUARY 24, 1916 | VII. FEBRUARY 25-MARCH 22, 1916 | VIII. MARCH 23-MAY 3, 1916 | IX. MAY 4-JUNE 15, 1916 | X. JUNE 16-JULY 18, 1916 | XI. JULY 19-AUGUST 18, 1916
Volume 3
I. AUGUST 19-SEPTEMBER 18, 1916 | II. SEPTEMBER 19-OCTOBER 25, 1916 | III. OCTOBER 27-NOVEMBER 22, 1916 | IV. NOVEMBER 23-DECEMBER 24, 1916 | V. DECEMBER 25, 1916-JANUARY 8, 1917 | VI. JANUARY 9-28, 1917 | VII. JANUARY 29-FEBRUARY 21, 1917 | VIII. FEBRUARY 22-MARCH 11, 1917 | IX. MARCH 12-22, 1917 | X. MARCH 23-APRIL 6, 1917 | XI. APRIL 7-21, 1917 | XII. APRIL 22-MAY 6, 1917 | XIII. MAY 7-17, 1917
CHAPTER XI
JULY 19-AUGUST 18, 1916.
The Empress and Rasputin force
the Emperor to dismiss Sazonov and put Sturmer in his place;
a very serious change. - Negotiations with Rumania. By the terms
of a military convention signed by Colonel Rudeanu at Chantilly,
the Rumanian army is to attack Bulgaria at once. - Secret negotiations
between Bucharest and Sofia; Bratiano throws over the Rudeanu
agreement. - Russian victory at Brody. - Sazonov's dismissal. - Future
prospects; an historical precedent: the Seven Years' War. - Rumania
hesitates again. - A telegram from the President of the Republic
to the Emperor. - Autocracy and regicide. - Polish uneasiness
about the fate of their country; the reactionary party regards
the settlement of the Polish question as the basis for a reconciliation
between tsarism and the Teutonic empires. - Rumania joins our
Alliance. - The Treaty of Bucharest.
Wednesday, July 19, 1916.
Near Lutzk, on the Volhynian frontier, the Russians have scattered
the Austro-Germans, who have left 13,000 prisoners in their hands.
In the Bukovina the Russian advance guards are crossing the
Carpathians.
Thursday, July 20, 1916.
When I called on Neratov this morning with Buchanan, we were
both struck by his grave air. He said to us:
"I have serious reason to think we are going to lose M.
Sazonov."
"What has happened
"You know that M. Sazonov has long had enemies, and who
they are. His success the other day in the Polish question has
been exploited against him. Someone who is very fond of him, and
whom I can trust absolutely, has told me that His Majesty has
decided to relieve him of his post."
Coming from a man as reserved and cautious as Neratov, such
words left no room for doubt.
It was quite unnecessary for Buchanan and me to put our heads
together to realize the full meaning of the blow in store for
us.
Buchanan asked:
"Do you think that M. Paléologue and I could even
now do anything to prevent the dismissal of M. Sazonov?"
"Possibly."
"What could we do?"
To clear the air, I begged Neratov to give us full details
of the news which has so naturally alarmed him:
"The person from whom I've received this report,"
he said, "has seen the letter His Majesty ordered to be drafted;
it is couched in friendly terms and simply relieves M. Sazonov
of his functions on grounds of health."
I fastened on to these last words, which seemed to me to offer
the ambassadors of France and England a legitimate excuse to intervene.
Then I sat down at Neratov's table for a few moments and drafted
a telegram which Buchanan and I could dispatch simultaneously
to the heads of our military missions at Mohilev, asking them
to show them to the Minister of the Court. The telegram ran as
follows
I am told that M. Sazonov has decided to place his resignation
before His Majesty on grounds of health. Please get this report
officially confirmed by the Minister of the Court.
If it is true, please impress very strongly on Count Fredericks
that a sympathetic word from His Majesty would, no doubt, inspire
M. Sazonov to a fresh effort, which would enable him to complete
his task.
My English (... French) colleague and I cannot help being
greatly perturbed by the thought of the comment which the resignation
of the Russian Foreign Minister would not fail to arouse in Germany,
for the overstrain from which he is now suffering is unquestionably
not serious enough to justify his retirement.
At this decisive moment of the war, anything which could look
like a change in the policy of the Allies might have the most
disastrous consequences.
Neratov entirely approved this telegram, and Buchanan and I
immediately returned to our embassies to send it to Mohilev.
This afternoon I received from a reliable source certain details
of the intrigue against Sazonov. My informant (a woman) does not
know how far things have got and I have been careful not to tell
her.
"Sazonov's position is very much compromised," she
said; "he has lost the confidence of Their Majesties."
"What's the accusation against him?"
"He's accused of not getting on with Sturmer and, on the
other hand, getting on too well with the Duma... . And then
Rasputin hates him - which is enough by itself."
"So the Empress has absolutely made common cause with
Sturmer?"
"Yes, absolutely. Sturmer is full of low cunning and he
has succeeded in persuading her that she alone can save Russia.
She's saving her at this very moment; she went off to Mohilev
quite unexpectedly last night
Friday, July 21, 1916.
In Armenia the Russians are continuing their offensive with
brilliant success.
On the Black Sea shore they have occupied Vaksi-Kebir, west
of Trebizond, and their advance guards are entering the valley
of Kelkit-lrmak. Further inland, the capture of Gemish-Kanch makes
them master of the great road which starts from Trebizond and
branches to Erzerum and Erzinghan. They are also threatening this
latter town by a rapid advance along the upper course of the Euphrates.
Saturday, July 22, 1916.
General Janin and General Williams have delivered their messages
to the Minister of the Court. General Janin's reply is as follows:
The Minister of the Court, though not always seeing eye to
eye with M. Sazonov, had already impressed on the Emperor that
his departure, at the present juncture, would certainly make
a bad impression. The Emperor replied that the extreme exhaustion
from which M. Sazonov is now suffering, and which deprives him
of both appetite and sleep, really does not allow him to go on
with his work; in any case his sovereign decision had been taken.
Count Fredericks has, however, promised to show the Emperor the
two telegrams of the French and English Ambassadors, but he added
that he would not ask His Majesty to answer them.
Sazonov, who is still in Finland, was informed yesterday of
his dismissal. He received the news with the quiet dignity that
might have been expected of his character:
"At bottom," he said, "His Majesty is right
in dispensing with my services. I disagreed with Sturmer on too
many questions."
As the afternoon was ending Neratov came to tell me, on express
orders from His Majesty, that the change at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs would have no effect whatever on the foreign policy of
the Empire.
Sunday, July 23, 1916.
This morning the Press officially announces the retirement
of Sazonov(1) and Sturmer's appointment in his
place. No comments. But I hear that first impressions are a wave
of amazement and indignation.
This evening I have been dining with the Grand Duchess Marie
Pavlovna, in the company of Princess Paley, Madame Helen Narishkin
and the maids-of-honour.
After dinner the Grand Duchess took me to the bottom of the
garden; she made me sit beside her and we had a talk.
"I simply can't tell you," she said, "how grieved
I .am about the present and how worried about the future."
"Tell me how you think it's all happened. Then I'll tell
you the little I know."
We shared our information. Our conclusions were as follows:
The Emperor and Sazonov saw absolutely eye to eve on foreign
policy. They were also at one on the Polish question, as the Emperor
had entirely adopted the views of his minister and actually instructed
him to draw up the manifesto to the Polish nation. In the other
questions of home policy Sazonov's liberal leadings had in practice
no opportunity to find expression; in any case he had but a purely
personal right to voice them and they were extremely moderate.
Last but not least, he was on the best possible terms with General
Alexeiev. His sensational dismissal cannot therefore be explained
by any admissible motive. The explanation unhappily forced upon
us is that the camarilla, of which Sturmer is the instrument,
wanted to get control of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. For
several weeks Rasputin has been saying: "I've had enough
of Sazonov, quite enough!" Urged on by the Empress, Sturmer
went to G.H.Q. to ask for Sazonov's dismissal. The Empress went
to his rescue, and the Emperor gave way.
By way of conclusion the Grand Duchess asked me:
"You regard the prospect pessimistically, don't you?"
"Yes, very. The French monarchy once saw good ministers
dismissed through the influence of a Court faction; their names
were Choiseul and Necker; Your Highness knows the sequel."
In Volhynia, at the confluence of the Lipa and the Styr, General
Sakharov's army has routed the Austro-Germans and made 12,000
prisoners.
Tuesday, July 25, 1915.
I have telegraphed to Paris:
Looking at the future this is how the situation appears to
me:
I do not fear any change for the immediate, or even near future
in the foreign policy of Russia and the declaration the Emperor
sent me On July 22 through M. Neratov makes me quite confident
for the present. The official action of imperial diplomacy will
thus probably continue as before. We must, however, expect to
see new faces and a new spirit gradually appear in the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs. We must also expect that the secrets of
our negotiations will not long be a secret to certain persons
who, by their pro-German leanings, indirect relations with the
German aristocracy or German finance and their hatred of liberalism
and democracy, have been completely won over to the idea of a
reconciliation with Germany.
At the present time these people can only work for the realization
of their desires in a very underhand and circumspect fashion.
The patriotic impulse of the nation is still so strong that if
it discovered their game it would destroy them. But if a few
months hence, when winter comes, our military efforts have not
realized all our hopes, or victory inclines more to the Russian
armies than ours, the German party in Petrograd would become
dangerous, owing to the tools it possesses in the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs.
Wednesday, July 26, 1916.
The Press announces that the former War Minister, General Sukhomlinov,
who was confined in the Fortress of SS. Peter and Paul, has been
stricken by a mental affliction which makes it necessary to move
him to an asylum.
According to the information in my possession he is simply
suffering from neurasthenia. In any case, no one accepts the reason
put forward to explain the change.
Thursday, July 27, 1916.
Colonel Rudeanu, the Rumanian military attaché in, France,
has negotiated with the delegates of the Allied General Staffs
a convention which fixes at 150,000 the number of men to be employed
by the Rumanian High Command in an immediate attack on Bulgaria,
such an attack being timed to coincide with an offensive by the
Salonica army. The convention, which also governs the
relations of the two army groups, was signed at Chantilly on
July 23.
General Sarrail, commanding the Allied armies of the East,
has already received an order to plan a vast operation, the successive
objects of which will be: (1) to tie down the Bulgarian forces
in Southern Macedonia, in order to cover the mobilization and
concentration of the Rumanian army; (2) to aim at the destruction
of the enemy by an attack, to be pressed through ruthlessly the
moment the Rumanians take the offensive on the right bank of the
Danube.
But it came to my ears yesterday, from a secret source, that,
far from preparing to take the offensive against the Bulgarians,
the Rumanian Government is engaged in clandestine conversations
with the Sofia cabinet. The report is partially confirmed by a
telegram Buchanan received this morning from the English Minister
in Bucharest, in which it is said that the Rumanian President
of the Council has never accepted the idea of attacking Bulgaria
or even of declaring war on her.
Friday, July 28, 1916.
Poklenski, the Russian Minister in Bucharest, telegraphs that
Bratiano has categorically refused to attack Bulgaria; his English
colleague, Sir George Barclay, insists that the Allied Powers
should refrain from demanding such an attack, "otherwise
the help of Rumania will be irrevocably lost."
Buchanan and I have discussed the matter with Neratov. The
latter thinks that the Allied Powers should insist on Bratiano's
carrying out the undertakings specified in the Rudeanu Convention.
Buchanan agreed with Barclay. I supported Neratov.
I reminded them of all the sacrifices France has made to uphold
the Allied cause in the Balkan Peninsula.
"The French public," I said, "would never understand
the offensive being taken by the Salonica army without a joint
offensive on the Danube; they would be furious at the idea of
French soldiers being killed in Macedonia to make it more easy
for the Rumanians to annex Transylvania. And then again, without
being an expert in strategy, I think that it is to the interest
of the Rumanians themselves to put the Bulgarians out of action
before they take the field north of the Carpathians. As for the
secret conversations which I am told are in progress between Bucharest
and Sofia, I have no doubt they will fail. I should be terribly
upset if they succeeded, as that would mean that the whole of
the Bulgarian army would turn against our Army of the East."
Neratov entirely agrees with me.
Saturday, July 29, 1916.
The Russian Army won a victory yesterday at Brody, in Galicia.
This afternoon Sturmer came to pay me his official call. Ceremonious
and "soapy," as he always is, he told me that in entrusting
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to him the Emperor had ordered
him to conduct the foreign policy of the Empire on the same principles
as before, i.e., in the closest co-operation with the Allied Governments.
"I attach special importance," he added, "to
working hand in hand with the Government of the Republic. So I
want all your help and confidence."
I thanked him for his assurances, telling him he might rely
on the friendly energy I should bring to our collaboration, and
congratulating him on opening his period of office under the auspices
of the Brody victory.
Then I tried to draw him into explaining the ultimate aims
of his policy and his ideas on the future status of Germany. On
this point he seems to me to have but very vague notions; he does
not even seem to know the Emperor's own views; but he made a remark
I have frequently heard from the imperial lips
"No pity, no mercy for Germany!"
He took his leave of me with exaggerated and obsequious bows.
In the doorway he repeated:
"No pity, no mercy for Germany!"
Sunday, July 30, 1916.
The British Government has to-day asked the Russian Government
not to insist that Rumania shall attack Bulgaria.
When appealed to by Neratov, I repeated the arguments I used
yesterday, adding that I also could not see what was the object
of sending 50,000 Russians to the Dobrudja if they were to stand
idle while the Salonica army faced the whole shock of the Bulgarian
armies.
Late in the afternoon Neratov let me know that General Alexeiev
would not allow 50,000 Russians to be sent to the Dobrudja unless
their function was to make an immediate attack on the Bulgarians.
Monday, July 31, 1916.
Continuing their offensive on a front of one hundred and fifty
kilometres, the Russian Volhynian and Galician armies have driven
the Austro-Germans before them in the direction of Kovel, Vladimir-Volynsk
and Lemberg, capturing 60,000 prisoners. Thus, since this vast
operation began, the Russians have made 345,000 prisoners.
In Armenia the Turks have been driven out of Erzinghan and
are fleeing towards Karput and Sivas.
Tuesday, August 1, 1916.
Briand has telegraphed to me as follows:
As regards a Rumanian declaration of war. I share the view
of Sir Edward Grey and General Joffre that in the last resort
we should not insist on an immediate declaration of war on Bulgaria;
it is quite probable that the Germans will force the Bulgarians
into attacking the Rumanians at once, and the Russian divisions
can then commence hostilities.
It is equally probable that as the Rumanians have not prepared
for operations south of the Danube, but have concentrated the
bulk of their forces in the Carpathians, they will get a rude
shock from the Bulgarians.
Thursday, August 3, 1916.
Sazonov is back from Finland and yesterday called at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to take leave of the staff. He has just been
to see me.
We had a long and affectionate chat. He was exactly what I
was sure he would be - self-possessed, dignified, without the
least trace of bitterness, glad for his own sake to have recovered
his independence, but grieved and anxious about the future of
Russia.
He confirmed all I had heard about the circumstances of his
dismissal:
"It's a year since the Empress began to be hostile towards
me," he said. "She's never forgiven me for begging the
Emperor not to assume command of his armies. She brought such
pressure to bear to secure my dismissal that the Emperor ultimately
gave way. But why this scandal? Why this 'scene'? It would have
been so easy to pave the way for my departure with the excuse
of my health! I should have given loyal assistance! And why did
the Emperor give me so confident and affectionate a reception
the last time I saw him?"
And then, in a tone of deepest melancholy, he more or less
summed up his unpleasant experience in these words:
"The Emperor reigns: but it is the Empress who governs
- under Rasputin's guidance. Alas! May God protect us!"
Friday, August 4, 1916.
I have been for a solitary motor ride on the Sestroretzk road,
which runs along the northern edge of Kronstadt Bay. The deep
blue of the sky, the utter peacefulness of sunshine, the infinite
distances of the horizon and the deep, gentle murmur of the waves
created a marvellous atmosphere for quiet reflection.
I thought of the sinister possibilities which Sazonov's dismissal
compels me to contemplate. More than ever before, the future appears
to me as "a night of doubt and darkness," to use Bossuet's
fine phrase. I must now face the possibility of a Russian defection;
it is an eventuality which must henceforth enter into the political
and strategical calculations of the French Government. No doubt
the Emperor Nicholas will stand by our alliance to the very end;
I feel no anxiety whatever on that score. But he is not immortal.
How many Russians, even - or rather, especially - those in closest
contact with him, are secretly longing for his disappearance!
What would happen if there was a change of sovereign? On that
point I have no illusions: there would be an immediate defection
of Russia. Besides, is there not an historical precedent? Can
I forget the end of the Seven Years' War, and how Peter III had
barely mounted his throne before he lost no time in deserting
the French Alliance and seeking a shameful reconciliation with
Frederick II?
I have considered every aspect and all the consequences of
this hypothesis, and however ruthless I am in my survey it is
an immense relief to me to realize that my faith in our ultimate
victory remains unshakable. But there is one thought which has
crossed my mind several times already. and has now taken root
in my soul as the logical conclusion of my reflections. My original
idea of our ultimate victory was too simple-minded. That Germany
and Austria are doomed to defeat there can be no doubt; it is
on that point that my confidence is unshaken. But it will be a
very long time before the Teutonic empires meet their fate, and
the feebler the Russian effort the longer that time will be. If
Russia cannot find within her the strength to perform her duties
as an ally to the bitter end, if she prematurely retires from
the struggle or falls into revolutionary convulsions, she will
inevitably dissociate her cause from ours; she will make it impossible
for herself to share in the fruits of our victory and she will
find herself involved in the defeat of the Central Empires.
Saturday, August 5, 1916.
General Alexeiev has come round to the opinion of General
Joffre and Briand, and agrees that the Rumanian effort shall be
directed exclusively against Austria; he consents to the operations
against Bulgaria being deferred, but thinks that such operations
are bound to begin by themselves. He insists that Bratiano's procrastination
shall be put an end to, once and for all, by definitely fixing
the date on which the Rumanian army must take the field.
Sunday, August 6, 1916.
Bratiano's procrastination and haggling still continue; the
explanation being, I think, that he still hopes to arrive at a
direct understanding with the Bulgars. Ever faithful to the principles
of his game, he ascribes his hesitation to the ill-will of Russia.
Hence, further bickerings between Paris and Petrograd.
This morning I was instructed to convey to the Emperor a telegram
from the President of the Republic.(2)
When handing this telegram to Sturmer, I repeated the arguments
I have recently dinned into his ears; the main argument--and to
my eyes the real one - being the enormous sacrifices France
has already made in the common cause and the wastage of our effectives
in the carnage of Verdun.
Sturmer, who fears nothing so much as being drawn into dealings
with the Emperor, replied at first by protestations of loyalty
to the Alliance and a panegyric of Verdun. He continued:
"So I attach the same importance as your Government to
securing the immediate assistance of Rumania. Of course you know
General Alexeiev's view on the subject. In military matters
his influence with the Emperor is final. You will remember that
it was he who suggested putting an end to M. Bratiano's hesitation
by fixing a date limit for the negotiations. How good his judgment
was! You may take it from me that it was a terrible mistake to
reopen the discussion with the Rumanian Government; we ought to
have stood by the very liberal terms of our memorandum of July
17 and refused any further haggling. Can't you see that M. Bratiano
is only trying to gain time? The date originally fixed by General
Alexeiev was August 7; it had to be extended to August 14.
M. Bratiano, in now requiring that your Salonica army shall take
the offensive ten days before Rumania opens hostilities, is patently
aiming at securing further delay. I tell you again we made a great
mistake in lending ourselves to his game, which is only too obvious.
But I'll promise to' report to His Majesty exactly what you've
just told me."
Sturmer is sincere in what he tells me, for a reason which
makes any other unnecessary, i.e., General Alexeiev, has
taken charge of this Rumanian business and the Emperor is in agreement
with all his views. Now Sturmer knows that General Alexeiev
hates and despises him, and he is not the man to oppose him in
any way. Quite the contrary: he is extremely tactful with him
and talks very small in his presence.
Monday, August 7, 1916.
I believe I have frequently remarked oh the casual way in which
the Russians - even the most ardent devotees of tsarism and reaction - admit
the possibility of the Emperor's assassination. No one minds talking
about it in my presence. The only limit is that they slightly
clothe their meaning in the sketchy veil of euphemism or allusion.
As I was strolling on the Islands this afternoon I met Prince
O - -, a typical old Russian nobleman, of haughty manners, broad
and cultured views; a proud and glowing patriot. We walked and
talked together. After a long and pessimistic diatribe he casually
enlarged on the death of Paul I. I understood what he meant and
betrayed some surprise. Then he stopped crossed his arms, and
looking me full in the face, blurted out:
"What do you expect, Monsieur I'Ambassadeur! Under
a system of absolute power, if the sovereign goes mad, there's
nothing for it but to put him out of the way!"
"Obviously regicide is the necessary corrective to autocracy,"
I said. "In a sense, it might almost be called a principle
of public law."
We proceeded no further on this scandalous ground.
If we had continued the conversation, I should have reminded
Prince O - - that he could have supported his doctrine with several
ancient and venerable authorities. As far back as the reign of
Nero, the philosopher Seneca put an audacious aphorism into one
of his tragedies: For sacrifice to Jupiter there is no more
acceptable victim than an unjust monarch. And Joseph de Maistre,
who was in St. Petersburg at the time of the crime of March 23,
1801, has introduced an ingenious distinction into the casuistry
of regicide: "Though I might have to admit the right to kill
Nero, I should never admit any right to judge him."
Wednesday, August 9, 1916.
The following is the Emperor's reply to the telegram I forwarded
to the Emperor three days ago from the President of the Republic:
Being entirely of your opinion, Monsieur le Président,
as to the necessity of Rumania's taking the field immediately,
I have ordered my Foreign Minister to authorize my minister in
Bucharest to sign the convention, the terms of which will be
agreed between M. Bratiano and the representatives of the Allied
Powers.
The arrival of German and Turkish reinforcements is reducing
the pace of the Russian advance on the Galician front, but the
Russians are still approaching Tarnopol and Stanislau.
Thursday, August 10, 1916.
At luncheon to-day I had General Leontiev, who is to command
one of the Russian brigades in France, Dimitri Benckendorff, Count
Maurice Zamoÿski, Count Ladislas Wielopolski and others.
In the smoke room I had a long and confidential talk with Zamoÿski
and Wielopolski. They told me of the anxiety, or rather the acute
apprehension, they feel over the latest attitude of the Russian
Government towards Poland; they know that the Emperor's liberal
intentions remain unchanged, but they do not think him capable
of resisting the intrigues of the reactionary party and the daily,
insistent influence of Rasputin and the Empress.
As Zamoÿski is shortly going to Stockholm, I have asked
him to lunch with me again in a few days' time.
Friday, August 11, 1916.
Yesterday the Italians entered Gorizia, where they have made
15,000 prisoners; they are pressing their attack in an easterly
direction.
On the right bank of the Sereth the Austro-Germans have been
routed once more and the Russians have captured Stanislau.
If only the Rumanians had come in a month ago!
Saturday, August 12, 1916.
When I summarize all the signs of political and social decomposition
I see before me, I feel sorry that the satirical genius of Gogol
has no heir in Russian literature to give us a fresh edition - a
somewhat enlarged and more melancholy edition - of the Dead
Souls.
And I understand the remark wrung from Pushkin by his reading
of that caustic masterpiece God in Heaven, what a gloomy place
Russia is!
Sunday, August 13, 1916.
I have recently had opportunities of talking to French or Russian
manufacturers and merchants residing in the provinces, Moscow,
Simbirsk, Voronej, Tula, Rostov, Odessa and the Donetz, and I
have asked them all if the conquest of Constantinople is still
considered the indispensable war aim in circles in which they
move.
Their replies have been almost identical; summarized, they
are as follows:
Among the rural masses the dream of Constantinople, which has
never taken definite shape, is becoming increasingly vague, remote
and unreal. From time to time a priest reminds them that the Russian
people is under a sacred duty, a holy obligation, to wrest Tsarigrad
from the infidel and raise the orthodox cross on the dome of Santa
Sophia. His audience listens to him with a composed and dutiful
attention, but without attaching more practical and direct significance
to his words than if he were speaking of the Last Judgment and
the torments of Hell. It should also be observed that the moujik,
who is eminently peace-loving and tender-hearted and always
ready to fraternize with his enemy, is revealing an increasing
loathing for the horrors of war.
In working-class circles there is not the slightest interest
in Constantinople. Russia is considered large enough already,
and instead of shedding the blood of the people in absurd conquests
the Tsar's government would do far better to relieve the woes
of the proletariat.
In the next higher stage, i.e., among the middle class, business
men, industrial leaders, engineers, lawyers. doctors, etc., the
importance of the problem with which the fate of Constantinople
faces Russia is fully recognized; it is not forgotten that the
outlet through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles is necessary
to the export of Russian grain, and everyone wishes to end a situation
in which an order from Berlin can sever that outlet. But the historical
and mystic doctrine of the Slavophiles is disregarded, and even
reprobated, arid the conclusion reached is that it would be enough
to secure the neutralization of the Straits under the guarantee
of an international organism.
The advocates of the idea of incorporating Constantinople in
the Empire are now to be found only in the very small camp of
the Nationalists and the group of doctrinaire Liberals.
But apart from the question of Constantinople and the Straits,
the attitude of the Russian people towards the war is in general
satisfactory. With the exception of the Social-Democratic party
and some members of the Extreme Right of the reactionaries, there
is no one who is not determined to continue the war to final victory.
Monday, August 14, 1916.
Count Maurice Zamoÿski is preparing to leave for Stockholm
very shortly and has been to lunch again with me. We were alone.
Our talk lasted two hours and was confined exclusively to Poland
and her future.
In everything he has said or given me to understand, I trace
the echo of the discussions which have been agitating Polish circles
in Petrograd, Moscow and Kiev since Sazonov's dismissal. There
is no doubt that the increasing influence of the reactionary party
in the Imperial Government is delaying and complicating the settlement
of the Polish question. On the one hand, notwithstanding the successes
of the Russian army in Galicia, the Poles are convinced that Russia
will not emerge from the war victorious, and that tsarism at bay
is even now preparing to negotiate a reconciliation with the Teuton
empires at the expense of Poland. Under the spur of that notion
they feel all their old hatreds reviving, and the sentiment is
reinforced by a sarcastic contempt for the Russian colossus, whose
weakness, impotence and moral and physical infirmities are now
being ruthlessly revealed. But the very fact that they have lost
all confidence in Russia absolves them, they think, from all obedience
or obligation to her. Henceforth they are fixing all their hopes
on France and England, and putting forward national claims which
are altogether excessive. Autonomy under the sceptre of the Romanovs
is not enough: they must have complete and absolute independence,
and the wholesale resurrection of the Polish State; they will
not stop until they have secured the triumph of their cause at
the peace congress. More. emphatically than ever they deny the
empire of the tsars any right to domination over the Slav peoples,
or to speak in their name or control their historical evolution;
the Russians must henceforth realize that in the hierarchy of
civilization the Poles and the Czechs are far ahead of them. .
. .
Tuesday, August 15, 1916.
With a large number of Russians - I could almost say with the
majority - moral instability is such that they are never satisfied
to be where they are, and can never wholly and whole-heartedly
enjoy anything. They are always wanting something new and unexpected,
stronger emotions, greater shocks, more titillating pleasures.
Hence the eternal search for stimulants and narcotics, an insatiable
appetite for adventures and an uncontrollable love of the freakish.
To sum up the conversation which has just inspired me to these
remarks, I have only to record the melancholy confession which
Turgueniev puts into the mouth of one of his heroines, the attractive
Anna Sergueïevna Odintsov: "When we're enjoying a musical
performance, or an evening party, or a heart-to-heart talk with
someone we like, how is it that our enjoyment seems an allusion
to an unknown and remote happiness rather than a real happiness
from which we should be deriving actual pleasure?" And the
friend to whom she is speaking replies: "You can never be
happy in. the spot you happen to be at the moment!"
Wednesday, August 16, 1916.
Between the Dniester and the Zlota-Lipa the Russians are continuing
their advance. They occupied Jablonitza yesterday.
The Bucharest negotiations are on the point of fruition.
Friday, August 18, 1916.
Bratiano and the ministers of the Allied Governments signed
the Treaty of Alliance at Bucharest yesterday.
By the terms of this treaty, France, Great Britain, Italy and
Russia guarantee the territorial integrity of Rumania; they also
undertake to secure her the Bukovina (with the exception of a
few northern districts), Transylvania and the Banat of Temesvar
when the general peace is signed: Rumania will thus double her
present population and territory.
Rumania, for her part, undertakes to declare war on Austria-Hungary
and break off all economic relations with the enemies of her new
allies.
A military convention is annexed to the Treaty of Alliance.
This convention provides that the Rumanian High Command guarantees
to attack the Austro-Hungarian forces by August 28 at the latest.
The Russian High Command in turn undertakes to open a vigorous
offensive along the whole Austro-Hungarian front. and more particularly
in the Bukovina, in order to cover the mobilization and concentration
of the Rumanian forces. With the same object in view the Allied
General Staffs undertake that the Salonica army shall make a strong
attack on the whole Macedonian front by August 20 at the latest.
History will say whether Bratiano has chosen his moment well.
Speaking personally, I still think that through over-caution or
over-subtlety he has already let slip three opportunities far
more favourable than the present juncture.
The first occasion was early in September, 1914, when the
Russians were entering Lemberg. At that time Austria and Hungary
were bewildered and terror-stricken, and quite incapable of defending
the Carpathian frontier; the Rumanians would have found all the
roads open to them.
The second chance was in the month of May, 1915.
Italy had just appeared on the scene. In a political and military
sense, Russia was at the height of her power. In Athens, Venizelos
was in office. And Bulgaria was still hesitating as to her course.
The third and final opportunity was two and a half months ago,
at the beginning of the great Russian offensive, before the arrival
of German and Turkish reinforcements in Galicia and Transylvania,
and before Hindenburg, the "Iron Marshal," had concentrated
all the power of his strategic genius on the eastern front.
But in action one must never waste time over retrospective
hypotheses: they are not legitimate, and are useful only in so
far as they throw light on the present. From this point of view
it is obvious that the dilatory policy of Bratiano has made the
enterprise on which Rumania has embarked much more difficult and
hazardous. I should also say that it is his fault that proper
preparation has not been made for the co-operation of the Russian
armies, their supply and transport, and the co-ordination of their
action with the plan of campaign in the Balkans. Things are still
where they were six months ago, at the time of my conversations
with Philippesco.
But for all that the accession of Rumania to our Alliance is
an event of high importance, not only for the practical results
of the present war but also for the ulterior development of French
policy in Eastern Europe.
Chapter Footnotes
1. The Emperor's rescript to Sazonov ran
as follows:
Sergei Dimitrievitch, since your entry into the service of
the State you have devoted your attention to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs and held important posts in diplomacy, and in
1910 I called you to the responsible office of Minister for Foreign
Affairs. You have carried out the important duties associated
with the headship of that Ministry with tireless zeal, and devoted
yourself wholeheartedly to realize my wishes, which have been
inspired by the requirements of justice and the honour of our
dear country.
Unfortunately your health has been shattered by overwork and
you have decided to ask me to relieve you of the office you hold.
In granting your request I consider it a duty to tell you
of my sincere gratitude for your devoted service.
You will always have my friendship and sincere gratitude.
NICHOLAS.
At Imperial Headquarters, July 7, 1916.
2. The telegram ran as follows:
I think it my duty to inform Your Majesty of the very great
importance the French General Staff attaches to the conclusion
at the earliest possible moment of the agreement with Rumania.
Rumanian assistance would be very important at the present moment,
as the enemy has not yet been able to take steps to meet the
danger on that side, but if that assistance were delayed its
value would only be secondary because the enemy would have received
notice and made his arrangements. The Austrian army is the weak
point in the hostile coalition. If it were put out of action,
it would have a direct effect on the German army which has to
support it. By making the necessary arrangement with Rumania
to crush the Austrian army, we should compel Germany go make
an additional effort which may well be beyond her immediate resources.
The data at the disposal of the Russian General Staff and ours
seem to indicate that the Central Empires have no troops available
at the moment. Suddenly to open a new and immediately critical
theatre of operations, while Germany has all she can do to meet
the dangers of the vigorous Russian thrust, would deprive her
of time to make good her losses or organize and bring up new
formations. On the other hand, if the negotiations are spun out,
it will give our enemies time to have the passes of the Transylvanian
Alps occupied by formations of purely defensive value, but adequate
to hamper, if not to hold up, any advance by the Rumanian army.
General Joffre and the French General Staff thus think that we
are faced with a fleeting opportunity which must not be allowed
to slip. An immediate intervention by Rumania would enable us
to break the deadlock definitely in our favour. In a few weeks,
when snow falls in the Carpathians and the passes are held, the
right moment will have passed. Success appears to be a matter
of days.
I am sure that Your Majesty sees the military situation in
the same light as the Government of the Republic and the French
Commander-in-Chief, and considers the speedy conclusion of the
convention with Rumania as equally desirable. I ask Your Majesty
to accept my fresh congratulations on the magnificent successes
of the Russian army and the assurance of my loyal friendship.
POINCARÉ.
Paris, August 5, 1916.
